Final report on 2008 British Airways Boeing 777 accident at Heathrow

by B. N. Sullivan

The United Kingdom's Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) has released the final report on the investigation of the 2008 accident involving a British Airways Boeing 777-236ER (registration number G-YMMM) at London's Heathrow International Airport (LHR). On January 17, 2008, British Airways Flight BA 038 landed short of runway runway 27L at LHR after both of the aircraft's engines failed to respond to throttle inputs while the aircraft was on final approach. The aircraft was arriving at Heathrow on a scheduled flight from Beijing. There were no fatalities or serious injuries among the 136 passengers and 16 crew members on board.

The newly released report, which is lengthy and very complex, includes detailed analyses and 18 safety recommendations. Here is an excerpt from the AAIB's report synopsis, including statements regarding probable cause:

Whilst on approach to London (Heathrow) from Beijing, China, at 720 feet agl, the right engine of G-YMMM ceased responding to autothrottle commands for increased power and instead the power reduced to 1.03 Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR). Seven seconds later the left engine power reduced to 1.02 EPR. This reduction led to a loss of airspeed and the aircraft touching down some 330 m short of the paved surface of Runway 27L at London Heathrow. The investigation identified that the reduction in thrust was due to restricted fuel flow to both engines.

It was determined that this restriction occurred on the right engine at its Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE). For the left engine, the investigation concluded that the restriction most likely occurred at its FOHE. However, due to limitations in available recorded data, it was not possible totally to eliminate the possibility of a restriction elsewhere in the fuel system, although the testing and data mining activity carried out for this investigation suggested that this was very unlikely. Further, the likelihood of a separate restriction mechanism occurring within seven seconds of that for the right engine was determined to be very low.

The investigation identified the following probable causal factors that led to the fuel flow restrictions:

1. Accreted ice from within the fuel system1 released, causing a restriction to the engine fuel flow at the face of the FOHE, on both of the engines.
2. Ice had formed within the fuel system, from water that occurred naturally in the fuel, whilst the aircraft operated with low fuel flows over a long period and the localised fuel temperatures were in an area described as the ‘sticky range’.
3. The FOHE, although compliant with the applicable certification requirements, was shown to be susceptible to restriction when presented with soft ice in a high concentration, with a fuel temperature that is below ‑10°C and a fuel flow above flight idle.
4. Certification requirements, with which the aircraft and engine fuel systems had to comply, did not take account of this phenomenon as the risk was unrecognised at that time.

Of particular interest to crew members is the section of the report that discusses the actions of the pilots in the final moments of the accident flight. Quoting from the AAIB report:

Final approach

The right engine ceased responding to autothrottle demands 57 seconds before the touchdown and within seconds the crew became aware that there was a problem with the engine thrust control of both engines. This presented the flight crew with a situation that was highly unusual, for which no specific training existed.

The rollback event occurred whilst the aircraft was close to the ground, leaving the crew very little time to react. The commander did make a ‘MAYDAY’ call during this period but he was not able, in the time available, to brief the cabin crew about the emergency or issue a ‘brace brace’ command.

Actions of the co-pilot

The co-pilot initially believed he had disconnected the autopilot at the intended height on the approach in order to carry out a manual landing on Runway 27L. However, as the aircraft descended through 600 ft he became aware of a problem with the engines, indicated by a split in the thrust lever positions. It is likely that, in attempting to understand the sudden and unprecedented problem with which he was presented he was distracted and thus omitted to disconnect the autopilot at this point.

Engine power had now reduced to a level at which the aircraft was losing airspeed and it started to descend below the glideslope. As the autopilot had remained engaged it attempted to maintain the ILS glide path by increasing the aircraft’s pitch attitude. This led to a further gradual reduction of airspeed, the initial ‘airspeed low’ master caution and the eventual triggering of the stall warning stick shaker. It was at this stage the co-pilot promptly pushed the control column forward, leading to the disconnect of the autopilot as overriding force was applied to the column to avoid the stall. However, the aircraft was now only 150 ft above the ground and a landing short of the runway surface was inevitable. At this point there was insufficient height available for the aircraft to develop the airspeed needed for a landing flare, to reduce the high rate of descent.

Actions of the commander

The commander, on realising that he was unable to obtain any additional thrust from the engines, attempted to reduce the drag of the aircraft by reducing the flap setting. However, the aircraft was now so close to the ground that there was little time for the beneficial affects of this action to take effect.

The action of reducing the flap setting was prompt and resulted in a reduction of the aerodynamic drag, with a minimal effect on the aircraft stall speed; it moved the point of initial ground contact about 50 m towards the runway threshold. Had the flaps remained at flap 30, the touchdown would have been just before the ILS antenna, but still within the airfield boundary. The effects of contact with the ILS antenna are unknown but such contact would probably have led to more substantial structural damage to the aircraft.

Assessment of flight crew actions - summary

From the available evidence, it is apparent that the flight crew’s preparation and conduct of the flight preceding the engine rollbacks was orderly, and in accordance with the operating company’s standard operating procedures.

On the final approach to land the flight crew were presented with an operational situation, a double-engine rollback at a low height, which was unprecedented. Most importantly at this point, when the stick shaker was alerting them to an impending stall, they kept the aircraft flying and under control so that, at impact, it was wings level and at a moderate pitch attitude. The reduction in flap setting did allow the aircraft to clear the ILS aerial array and, given more height, it would have been more effective.

In analysing the flight crew’s actions during final approach, the first indication of a problem was the thrust lever split. The flight crew did not, at this time, realise that this was associated with the ensuing engine rollback; slight splits in the thrust lever positions are common and manually moving the thrust levers back into alignment is a normal response. The flight crew became fully aware of the problem some 30 seconds before touchdown and at this point the subsequent high rate of descent at impact was inevitable.

The crew’s attention was on monitoring the approach and the external environment and, while the autopilot remained engaged, the crew’s focus was on the developing situation with falling engine thrust and reducing airspeed, and their subsequent attempts to restore power.

In the very limited time available after identification of the problem, the flight crew clearly prioritised their actions and thus did make the ‘MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY’ call, although they were not able to make the ‘brace brace’ call. The initial use of the VHF radio rather than PA system for the cabin evacuation call had no effect on the accident outcome.

Interested readers can download the entire report or any section by visiting this landing page on the AAIB Web site: Report on the accident to Boeing 777-236ER, G-YMMM, at London Heathrow Airport on 17 January 2008

BBC News posted on their Web site an audio file of radio communications between Air Traffic Control dialogue immediately before and after the crash of British Airways Flight 038.

Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 flight data recorder recovered

by B. N. Sullivan

There are some new developments regarding the investigation of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 409, the Boeing 737-800 aircraft that was lost shortly after taking off from Beirut on January 25, 2010. Most importantly, the aircraft's flight data recorder (FDR) has been recovered, and has been sent to France for analysis.

Yesterday, Lebanon's Transportation and Public Works Minister Ghazi Aridi announced that a part of the tail section of the aircraft was located by a search vessel in the Mediterranean Sea, off the coast of a Naameh. Mr. Aridi told the press that the newly discovered wreckage, which was found at a depth of about 45 meters (150 ft), was between 10 and 20 meters in length. Early this morning, divers were able to recover the FDR. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) has been located, but has not yet been recovered.

The remains of eight more victims who were lost in the accident also have been recovered. According to Reuters, 23 bodies have been recovered to date. The crash of Flight ET 409 claimed the lives of 90 people.

Some wreckage from the Ethiopian Airlines plane also was discovered on the shoreline of Syria, near the port city of Latakia. Syrian authorities have said they will hand over the wreckage to the Lebanese authorities.

Republic Airways to shut down Lynx Aviation and furlough crews

by B. N. Sullivan

When Republic Airways acquired Frontier Airlines several months ago, Lynx Aviation -- Frontier's regional turboprop subsidiary -- was a part of the deal. Now Republic has decided to do away with Lynx, shed its fleet of 11 Bombardier Q400 aircraft, and eliminate about 175 jobs.

Republic announced that Lynx Aviation will cease operations by mid-September of this year. Plans call for most of the current Lynx routes to be served in the future by Republic Airlines E-170 and E-190 aircraft, flown by Republic pilots.

Furloughs will begin in April. The Denver Post reports that of Lynx Aviation's 120 pilots and 110 flight attendants, 40 in each group will be retained until September, when remaining Lynx employees will be furloughed. The Denver Post quoted a Republic spokesman who said that Lynx employees will be given the opportunity to continue with Republic or Frontier and will receive priority hiring. Those who don't stay on will be given severance.

Highlights of the NTSB's findings on the Colgan Air accident near Buffalo in February 2009

by B. N. Sullivan

Yesterday the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a summary of its findings regarding the February, 2009 crash of a Colgan Air Bombardier DHC-8-400 near Buffalo, NY. The title of the press release that announced the findings read (in capital letters), CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS. Talk about cutting to the chase, right in the title!

Yesterday's report elaborated on the stark title of the press release, with this statement of probable cause:

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.

Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-speed cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.

The NTSB summary included a list of 46 individual conclusions. Among the findings:

• The recovered components showed no evidence of any preimpact structural, engine, or system failures, including no indications of any problems with the airplane’s ice protection system.
• The air traffic controllers who were responsible for the flight during its approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport performed their duties properly and responded immediately and appropriately to the loss of radio and radar contact with the flight.
• This accident was not survivable.
• The captain’s inappropriate aft control column inputs in response to the stick shaker caused the airplane’s wing to stall.
• The minimal aircraft performance degradation resulting from ice accumulation did not affect the flight crew’s ability to fly and control the airplane.

So, no support for those who theorized that icing was the cause of the accident. Instead, the NTSB seems to be saying that pilot error, independent of weather conditions, led to the tragic outcome.

Here's more:

• Explicit cues associated with the impending stick shaker onset, including the decreasing margin between indicated airspeed and the low-speed cue, the airspeed trend vector pointing downward into the low-speed cue, the changing color of the numbers on the airplane’s indicated airspeed display, and the airplane’s excessive nose-up pitch attitude, were presented on the flight instruments with adequate time for the pilots to initiate corrective action, but neither pilot responded to the presence of these cues.
• The reason the captain did not recognize the impending onset of the stick shaker could not be determined from the available evidence, but the first officer’s tasks at the time the low-speed cue was visible would have likely reduced opportunities for her timely recognition of the impending event; the failure of both pilots to detect this situation was the result of a significant breakdown in their monitoring responsibilities and workload management.
• The flight crew did not consider the position of the reference speeds switch when the stick shaker activated.
• The captain’s response to stick shaker activation should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with startle and confusion.
• The captain did not recognize the stick pusher’s action to decrease angle-of-attack as a proper step in a stall recovery, and his improper flight control inputs to override the stick pusher exacerbated the situation.
• It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to perform a tailplane stall recovery.
• No evidence indicated that the Q400 was susceptible to a tailplane stall.
• Although the reasons the first officer retracted the flaps and suggested raising the gear could not be determined from the available information, these actions were inconsistent with company stall recovery procedures and training.
• The Q400 airspeed indicator lacked low-speed awareness features, such as an amber band above the low-speed cue or airspeed indications that changed to amber as speed decrease toward the low-speed cue, that would have facilitated the flight crew’s detection of the developing low-speed situation.
• An aural warning in advance of the stick shaker would have provided a redundant cue of the visual indication of the rising low-speed cue and might have elicited a timely response from the pilots before the onset of the stick shaker.
• The captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight (1) enabled conversation that delayed checklist completion and conflicted with sterile cockpit procedures and (2) created an environment that impeded timely error detection.

These findings are uniformly damning of the captain and, to a lesser extent, the first officer. But then the NTSB report broadens the focus of responsibility to include Colgan Air, the pilots' employer:

• The monitoring errors made by the accident flight crew demonstrate the continuing need for specific pilot training on active monitoring skills.
• Colgan Air’s standard operating procedures at the time of the accident did not promote effective monitoring behavior.
• Specific leadership training for upgrading captains would help standardize and reinforce the critical command authority skills needed by a pilot-in-command during air carrier operations.
• Because of the continuing number of accidents involving a breakdown of sterile cockpit discipline, collaborative action by the Federal Aviation Administration and the aviation industry to promptly address this issue is warranted.
• The flight crewmembers’ performance during the flight, including the captain’s deviations from standard operating procedures and the first officer’s failure to challenge these deviations, was not consistent with the crew resource management (CRM) training that they had received or the concepts in the Federal Aviation Administration’s CRM guidance.

Next, issues related to the role played by pilot fatigue and possible illness are addressed:

• The pilots’ performance was likely impaired because of fatigue, but the extent of their impairment and the degree to which it contributed to the performance deficiencies that occurred during the flight cannot be conclusively determined.
• All pilots, including those who commute to their home base of operations, have a personal responsibility to wisely manage their off-duty time and effectively use available rest periods so that they can arrive for work fit for duty; the accident pilots did not do so by using an inappropriate facility during their last rest period before the accident flight.
• Colgan Air did not proactively address the pilot fatigue hazards associated with operations at a predominantly commuter base.
• Operators have a responsibility to identify risks associated with commuting, implement strategies to mitigate these risks, and ensure that their commuting pilots are fit for duty.
• The first officer’s illness symptoms did not likely affect her performance directly during the flight.

A number of the NTSB's findings addressed pilot qualificactions and training deficiencies:

• The captain had not established a good foundation of attitude instrument flying skills early in his career, and his continued weaknesses in basic aircraft control and instrument flying were not identified and adequately addressed.
• Remedial training and additional oversight for pilots with training deficiencies and failures would help ensure that the pilots have mastered the necessary skills for safe flight.
• Colgan Air’s electronic pilot training records did not contain sufficient detail for the company or its principal operations inspector to properly analyze the captain’s trend of unsatisfactory performance.
• Notices of disapproval need to be considered along with other available information about pilot applicants so that air carriers can fully identify those pilots who have a history of unsatisfactory performance.
• Colgan Air did not use all available sources of information on the flight crew’s qualifications and previous performance to determine the crew’s suitability for work at the company.
• Colgan Air’s procedures and training at the time of the accident did not specifically require flight crews to cross-check the approach speed bug settings in relation to the reference speeds switch position; such awareness is important because a mismatch between the bugs and the switch could lead to an early stall warning.
• The current air carrier approach-to-stall training did not fully prepare the flight crew for an unexpected stall in the Q400 and did not address the actions that are needed to recover from a fully developed stall.
• The circumstances of this and other accidents in which pilots have responded incorrectly to the stick pusher demonstrate the continuing need to train pilots on the actions of the stick pusher and the airplane’s initial response to the pusher.
• Pilots could have a better understanding of an airplane’s flight characteristics during the post-stall flight regime if realistic, fully developed stall models were incorporated into simulators that are approved for such training.
• The inclusion of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration icing video in Colgan Air’s winter operations training may lead pilots to assume that a tailplane stall might be possible in the Q400, resulting in negative training.

The remaining findings address systemic oversight issues; flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) programs; personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck; the use of safety alerts for operators (SAFOs), and weather data, including information related to icing.

The NTSB summary also includes 25 new recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Here is the link to the synopsis of the NTSB report, where you can read all of the findings and safety recommendations arising from the investigation of the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident: NTSB/AAR-10-01: Summary of Findings

The full final report will be released later this month. When that happens, I will post the link here on Aircrew Buzz.

Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 409 flight recorders located

by B. N. Sullivan

According to Reuters, a U.S. navy vessel has located the flight recorders from Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 409, the Boeing 737-800 that crashed shortly after takeoff from Beirut earlier this week. A brief news item reporting the find quoted a security official in Lebanon who said, "The U.S. ship located the black boxes 1,300 metres underwater and 8 km west of Beirut airport."

Let's hope the recorders can be recovered now and that their contents are able to be read.

More to follow as details become available.

[Hat tip to Twitter user @SamerKaram for the link to the Reuters article.]

Update on the Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 409 accident off the coast of Lebanon

by B. N. Sullivan

More information is emerging about the Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 409 accident. Air traffic controllers (ATC) lost contact with the aircraft, a Boeing 737-800 (registration ET-ANB), minutes after it took off from Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut, Lebanon, en route to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Flight ET 409 departed Beirut's runway 21 at approximately 02:30 AM local time on January 25, 2010.

A debris field was located off the coast of Lebanon, indicating that the aircraft had crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. An "aggressive" search and rescue operation was initiated by the Lebanese government and military, assisted by United Nations security forces in Beirut.

The airline has confirmed that eight crew members and 82 passengers were on board Flight ET 409. No survivors have been found, however dozens of bodies have been recovered and have been taken to Rafic Hariri University Hospital, according to Lebanon's National News Agency. Ethiopian Airlines said in a press release that 14 of the deceased have been identified so far, including six Ethiopians and eight Lebanese nationals.

The Ethiopian Airlines press release also stated:

The pilot of flight ET409 was a career flight professional with over 20 years of experience flying various aircraft over the expanded network of the airline.

The aircraft B737-800 with registration number ET-ANB involved in the accident has had its regular maintenance service as recently as December 25, 2009 at the maintenance facilities of the National carrier and was declared safe and fit to fly.

FlightGlobal.com reported earlier today that the aircraft had climbed to an altitude of about 9,000 ft before ATC lost contact with it. Weather data showed the presence of cumulonimbus clouds and thunderstorm activity in the area at the time of the accident.

A short time ago, the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) announced that a team was being dispatched to Lebanon to assist that country's Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGAC) with its investigation of the accident. The team will include technical advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Boeing, the manufacturer of the aircraft.

Condolences to the families and friends of those who perished in this accident, and to Ethiopian Airlines.

[Photo Source]

UPDATE Jan 27, 2010: Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 409 flight recorders located - AircrewBuzz.com, Jan. 27, 2010

Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 disappears from radar after taking off from Beirut

by B. N. Sullivan

An Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737-800 is believed to have crashed into the sea after disappearing from radar minutes after its departure from Beirut's Rafik Hariri International Airport. Ethiopian Flight ET 409 left Beirut shortly after 03:00 AM local time, en route to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Early reports say the aircraft had seven crew members and 85 passengers on board. [Correction: Eight crew/82 pax, per Ethiopian Airlines press release.]

Reuters is reporting that "residents on the coast [of Lebanon] saw a plane on fire crashing."

More to follow as information becomes available.

UPDATE: Ethiopian Airlines has issued a press release about the accident, confirming 82 passengers and eight crew members on board Flight ET 409. All eight crew members were Ethiopian nationals. Among the passengers, are 23 Ethiopians, 51 Lebanese, one Turkish, one French, two British, one Russian, one Canadian, one Syrian, and one Iraqi.

The accident aircraft is believed to be ET-ANB, a Boeing 737-800 manufactured in 2002, according to FlightGlobal.com's ACAS data. [per Jon Ostrower, @flightblogger for FlightGlobal.com]

At a press conference, Lebanese Transport Minister Ghazi al-Aridi said that the crash site had been located off the coast of the Lebanese village of Na'ameh, which is south of Beirut. Lebanese military boats and helicopters were said to be searching the area for survivors. Reuters reported that four bodies have been found.

Related:

• Update on the Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET409 accident off the coast of Lebanon - AircrewBuzz.com, Jan. 25, 2010
• Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 409 flight recorders located - AircrewBuzz.com, Jan. 27, 2010
• Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 flight data recorder recovered - AircrewBuzz.com, Feb. 7, 2010

Taban Air TU-154M crashes on arrival at Mashad, Iran

by B. N. Sullivan

A Tupolev TU-154M aircraft operated by Iranian carrier Taban Air was involved in a dramatic runway accident earlier today at Mashad, Iran. The aircraft broke up and caught fire shortly after landing on runway 31R at Mashad International Airport. There were no fatalities reported among the 13 crew and 157 passengers on board, although news media are reporting that more than 40 people were hospitalized as a result of the accident.

The aircraft (registration RA-85787), operating as flight HH-6347, was arriving at Mashad from Isfahan at the time of the accident. The flight had originated the night before at Abadan, on the coast of Iran, bound for Mashad. Due to poor weather at Mashad, the aircraft diverted to Isfahan; early this morning it resumed its journey to Mashad, its scheduled destination.

Landing at Mashad in poor visibility, the aircraft may have struck its tail on the runway. News reports also suggest that the aircraft then left the runway, and during the runway excursion its landing gear collapsed and both wings separated from the fuselage. Photos from the accident scene show that the tail section of the aircraft had burned, and both the vertical and horizontal stabilizers are missing.

Here is a video clip of the accident scene, from ITN News:

If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.

American Airlines announces new round of pilot furloughs

by B. N. Sullivan

American Airlines announced today "the unfortunate need to furlough up to 175 of our pilots in the first half of 2010." Among those who will be laid off are previously furloughed pilots who returned to work during the past year. The airline already has 1,887 pilots on furlough.

In a message to its membership, the Allied Pilots Association (APA), which represents American Airlines pilots, said that "management intends to furlough approximately 130 active pilots. Management has also indicated that the total could reach as high as 160 over the next two months." Presumably those numbers are estimates, since the airline mentioned 175 pilot furloughs in the first half of 2010, and the union specified 160.

According to APA:

The union leadership and Negotiating Committee are discussing a variety of potential furlough mitigation tools, such as voluntary leaves-of-absence and furloughs-in-stead. APA is hoping to compel management to institute early retirement incentives and other such mechanisms to minimize, if not outright eliminate, the need to furlough. Talks with management concerning these issues will continue.

Initial furlough notifications have begun and we estimate that approximately two-thirds of the furloughs will be effective at the end of February. The remaining furloughs will likely take effect at the end of March.

In a statement to the press, American Airlines said, "The impact of the economy and reduction in capacity over the last 18 months, coupled with lower than expected pilot attrition, has resulted in a pilot surplus. This was a painful but necessary decision, as this staffing adjustment will better align the size of our pilot organization with the size of our current operation."

Commenting on furlough mitigation negotiations with the pilots' union, American Airlines said:

"We are also pleased that we were able to work with the APA to move up the furlough date by one day to achieve eligibility for subsidized COBRA medical benefits for the first group of furloughed pilots.

"American values and respects the professionalism, commitment and contributions of our pilots and regrets having to make this difficult decision."

American last furloughed pilots in 2005.

[Photo Source]

PSA Airlines CRJ-200 runway overrun at Charleston, WV

by B. N. Sullivan

Late this afternoon, a PSA Airlines CRJ-200 aircraft overran a runway at Yeager Airport (CRW), Charleston, WV, following a rejected takeoff. The aircraft, operating as US Airways Express Flight JIA 2495, was departing on a scheduled passenger flight to Charlotte, NC, at the time of the incident. It came to a stop about 130 feet into the EMAS (Engineered Material Arresting System) area beyond the end of Runway 23 at CRW. No injuries have been reported among the three crew members and 30 passengers on board.

The incident occurred on January 19, 2010 at approximately 16:20 local time in Charleston. The reason for the rejected takeoff has not been reported.

WSAZ.com, reporting on a press conference held at Yeager Airport, quoted an official who said that there were "skid marks on the runway approximately 2,000 feet long." The good news is that the EMAS, which is 425 feet in length, obviously worked as intended. The aircraft reportedly stopped "about 125 feet from the edge of the mountain." The EMAS was installed at Yeager Airport in November of 2008.

By the way, @YeagerAirport did an exemplary job of live-tweeting information about the incident and its effects on the airport's operations in real time on Twitter. The photo above also was tweeted to the Yeager Airport Twitpic page.

[Photo Source]