Tuesday, December 22, 2009

American Airlines Boeing 737 crash in Jamaica

by B. N. Sullivan

American AirlinesA Boeing 737-800 aircraft (registration N977AN) operated by American Airlines has crashed in Jamaica. According to a statement from the airline, Flight AA 331 overran the runway on landing at Kingston, Jamaica's Norman Manley International Airport late on the evening of Tuesday, December 22, 2009. The flight had originated at Reagan/National Airport in Washington, DC, operating first to Miami International Airport, and then continuing on to Jamaica from Miami. On board were six crew members and 148 passengers.

News reports from Jamaica say that as many as 40 people may have been injured in the accident. A local official told the Jamaica Observer that the injured had been transported to Kingston Public Hospital.

Jamaican media are reporting that it was raining at the time of the accident.

More details to follow as more information becomes available.

UPDATE: News articles on several Web sites are quoting an American Airlines spokesman who says that the aircraft's fuselage was cracked, its number two engine separated from the wing, and the left main landing gear collapsed. It is unclear whether this damage occurred before or after the aircraft left the runway. Jamaican news sources report that the aircraft came to a rest against the airport perimeter fence.

UPDATE Dec. 23, 2009: In a statement issued early this morning, American Airlines confirmed that two passengers had been hospitalized for observation and treatment, while all other passengers that had been taken to local hospitals were treated and released. The statement did not mention any injuries to crew members.

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has dispatched a team to assist the Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority with the investigation of this accident. The NTSB team includes technical advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration, American Airlines, Boeing, GE Aircraft Engines, in addition to the NYSB's own aviation specialists.

A collection of still photos from the scene of the AA331 accident has been posted on CNN's iReport.

The video below, with raw footage of the accident scene last night, was posted on the Associated Press (AP) channel on YouTube.



If the video does not play or display properly above, click here to view it on YouTube.


Posted by B. N. Sullivan at 20:10
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4 comments:

  1. AA Jamaica crash: Although I am aware that it is irresponsible to speculate on a cause before all the facts are know, I do however feel that, at least on forums like this one, it is ok to speculate based on known facts. Here is what's known. 1) 15Kt. winds out of NNE. 2) Heavy rain at night on a non-grooved runway. 3) Pilots near the end of their 12-hour max. on-duty time. 4) Plane fully loaded with passengers and probably heavier on fuel than domestic flights. 5) Pilots had not flown much in previous weeks. 6) Plane touched down very far down runway 12. 7) Plane landed hard. Based on what’s known I think you can make the following deductions. I believe the tail winds played a very significant role in this crash. Ground speeds would have been 20-30Kts fast than pilots are used to. This along with a nighttime wet runway would have made it easy to misjudge the point of touchdown. Glide slope would have been kept in check on approach but near the ground pilots take over and visually fly the plane. Things would look much different than they normally do especially taking night, rain and fatigue issues into consideration. A go around would have been resisted because of a desire to get the plane on the ground due to bad conditions and current preferred patterns at that airport. As a pilot who has made down wind landings I can tell you that it is very difficult to hit your spot maintaining glide slope without stalling the plane. You have to descend at a quicker rate to maintain glide slope and touch down speeds to hit your spot. This is not a comfortable normal feeling to the pilots. Things happen so much quicker down wind and pilots are not used to this type of approach. Extra weight, rain, night, and fatigue and stress of bad conditions add to the level of difficulty of this down wind landing. I would not be surprised if the black boxes show the plane did or almost did “stall” just before touch down. That would explain the heavy landing reported. Higher ground speeds and weights with reduced runway length due to mid runway touch down point along with wet non-grooved runway made this crash, at this point, inevitable. At the end of the day there will be several factors pinpointed at fault (as there always is), however the primary cause will be pilot error for the following reasons: a) not going to an alternate airport given conditions at primary b) having proceeded to primary not asking to land from the east. c) having proceeded downwind failing to abort the approach and or landing prior to touchdown d) having proceeded downwind having misjudged the point of landing and not maintaining proper glide slope, approach speeds and touchdown point. To all the pilots I ask for your comments
    ReplyDelete
  2. The FAA reported, that there were 40 injuries, 4 of them serious. A wing and an engine detached from the aircraft.
    Lima Flights
    ReplyDelete
  3. Part II of II

    6) Same as 5).

    7) Same as 5). I have seen the post crash interviews of some of the passengers describing a hard landing, but at this point I don't know if they were actually referring to the first contact with the runway or the deceleration of the airplane leaving the rwy?

    I am not in agreement with much of the rest of your comments. I have no knowledge as of 28Dec whether the pilot flying was making a coupled approach, but if so, then the crosswind and tailwind limits for doing that are less that for an uncoupled, hand flown approaches. My point is that the AA pilots were operating with in established limits either way.

    A) - about how the runway would look different. The Pilot Flying, (PF), is on the instruments during the approach until the Pilot Not Flying, (PNF), calls "mimimums". At that point, which for this approach is probably 200' AGL, the PF transitions to changing his scan to both in and outside the cockpit. He still is mainly flying instruments, maintaining "centered needles" until about 50' where he will adjust the aircraft controls for a crosswind landing, if necessary and add the power needed for crossed controls to fly the aircraft down onto one MLG wheel, and so on. The instrument scan is vital during night time operations and since the rwy lighting was operating normally, the main concern once the pilot is mostly looking outside during the last part of the approach is that the windshield wipers are on Fast to clear the rain that is not being removed by the airplane's speed through the air. The point is, there would have been nothing out of the ordinary as to how this rwy looked to either pilot. It looked like all the other rwys they had seen at night in heavy rain.

    B) - Your required point of touchdown is the first 1000' feet of the rwy. You are not trying to hit your point as you describe. That is not how you fly an airliner day or night.

    C) Landing speeds are a minimum of 1.3 time Vs(stall spd for that weight), so this speculation about stall speed is not a factor.

    D) Not withstanding the normal expectation and desire to land on the first approach, I doubt that those feelings may have prevented the flt crew from initiating a go around if they perceived the need to do so. Their training is such that going around on an approach is just another part of the possible scenarios. They are trained to make both rejected landings and initiate missed approach for a variety of reasons. So until the NTSB comments on evidence that indicates the flt crew did NOT follow established procedures I would not be quick to assume they were intending to land no matter what.

    What has not been reported, which may be because it did not exist, is wind shear or possible micro burst activity in the KIN area. However if there were micro burst conditions present at the time AA 331 made its approach it may have manifested itself in the form of decreasing performance wind shear. This could have contributed to a hard landing.

    I apologize for the length of this post, but I have a quick version of what I would like to resolve before making any other than a WAG on the cause(s) of this mishap.

    I} Was the approach flown on airspeed and on glide path to minimums?

    II) Where did the airplane first touchdown on rwy 12?

    III) Was the anti-skid system functioning?

    IV) Were both engine thrust reversers operating?

    V) Did any object obstruct the ILS electrical signals during the approach of AA 331?

    VI) What were the last 72 hours of activity for both pilots? (meals, sleep, duty, etc.)

    VII) Medical history of both pilots including FAA approved prescription drugs.

    VIII) Was wind shear a factor?

    I have more but this is enough for now.

    Cheers,
    Zoo
    ReplyDelete
  4. Part I of II

    I enjoyed your speculation post Dave. I flew the 737-800 for 3 years with Delta Air Lines.

    I have no way of knowing what sources you used to say "Here is what's known."

    I will assume until that all the mishap airplane's systems were functioning properly until evidence to the contrary.

    on 1) I have looked through what's available to date in the news for some mention of the actual wind direction and velocity for KIN, (Kingston apt) at the time of the approach for AA 331. I have not been able to find it, and did not expect to since the typical initial news rarely covers that. I expect that info might be covered if the NTSB or Jamaican authorities release it as part of a news update. It will definitely be in the final NTSB report which I expect to see in a future issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine. However I did find this on a Google search regarding statements made by the KIN airport operations director.

    "The Kingston airport has one runway with two designations, depending on the direction of a plane's approach. Lights leading to the other end of the runway were functioning, but wind conditions made that approach less desirable, Smith said."

    So he's saying that the approach to rwy 12 was the best available. Either rwy 12 or 30 were the choices, or elect to fly to an alternate apt.

    Here is the METAR for the time of the approach:

    METAR MKJP 230300Z 32008KT 3000 +SHRA BKN014 FEW016CB SCT030 BKN100
    21/20 Q1014 RETSRA

    so I'll use that for my speculation.

    It appears that the data from the METAR does not agree with Mr. Smith. But I am assuming that Mr. Smith said what he said because there is no ILS approach to rwy 30, the other rwy. So they had to use rwy 12. Since the wind was not NNE but from the NW, we definitely have a tailwind component for the landing approach to rwy 12. The actual tailwind component on the aircraft with the METAR winds comes out to about 7.5 knots with a crosswind component from the left of 3 knots. If I knew the mag hdg for rwy 12 at KIN I could calculate it more precisely, but even using numbers for the rwy of 11 or 13 that only changes the crosswind component by a half a knot. Bottom line is that tailwind of 7 to 8 knots is within the limits of a Boeing NG 737 like the AA B 737-800, and so is the crosswind component. I cannot validate the weight you put on the role tail wind played in the mishap. It certainly was some small factor, but not to the point of raising the ground speed by 20-30 kts!! The math does not support that. And it's also way over the tailwind landing limits of every airliner I am type rated in or have flown.

    2) the METAR supports the heavy rain and that runway is not grooved

    3) crew fatigue is a possible factor

    4) The 148 passenger seats were all occupied. Crew of 6 with no jumpseat rider(s) based upon the 154 number reported in the news. But the statement of carrying more fuel is not of particular significance compared to other flights flown by AA in a 737-800 from Miami to KIN. The US flag carriers that fly international flights do not carry fuel loads that are in excess of FAR fuel reserve requirements including inclement weather. It costs us two lbs of fuel to carry one lb of fuel. The only time where tankering fuel into an airport would be used is if the cost of fuel at that airport is higher than the airline wanted to pay. So this aircraft would not have been flying at a heavier weight than is normal for flight operations into KIN.

    5) Have not heard that. I simply don't know. I expect like other more detailed info, more info on the crew will be forthcoming.
    ReplyDelete

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